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PRIVATE ACTORS IN PUBUC 
INTERNATIONAL lAW: AMICUS CURIAE 
AND THE CASE FOR THE RETENTION OF 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
DUNCAN B. HOLLIS* 
Abstract: Recent debates regarding the impact of globalization on state 
sovereignty have led some to conclude that globalization is eroding such 
sovereignty. This Article challenges that conclusion. It argues that 
neither the current frenzy of private actor participation in international 
fora nor the law-making functions of international organizations at 
which such activity is directed supplants state sovereignty in some zero-
sum game paradigm. Examining the emergence of amicus curiae in 
international dispute settlement-specifically the controversy over amici 
participation in the WfO Asbestos case-the Article concludes that both 
private actor participation in international law and the exercise of law-
making authorities by international organizations has occurred, and can 
only continue to occur, with the consent of states. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the title of this Symposium-Globalization and the Erosion of 
Sovereignty-suggests, scholars are devoting increasing attention to 
the relationship between globalization and the sovereignty of states.l 
Specifically, scholars debate whether globalization, in the sense of in-
creasing transnational movement of capital, goods, people, pollution, 
diseases, and ideas, is eroding the sovereignty of states, which has 
served as the central tenet of the international legal order since the 
*Attorney-Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 
State. J.D., Boston College Law School, 1996; M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law & Diplo-
macy, 1996; A.B., Bowdoin College, 1992. The views expressed in this Article are those of 
the author and not those of the Department of State. The author would like to thank Pro-
fessor Cynthia Lichtenstein, in whose honor the Symposium was held, for the inspiration 
to pursue a career in international law, and Jo Brooks, Melanie Khanna, and Bart Legum 
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
I See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999) 
("[A]nalysts have argued that sovereignty is being eroded by one aspect of the contempo-
rary international system, globalization, and others that it is being sustained .... "). 
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Peace of Westphalia in 1648.2 Proponents of this viewpoint generally 
cite two developments in making their case. First, they claim that sov-
ereign states, originally defined as entities subject to no external 
authority or control, now increasingly find themselves subject to in-
ternational regulation that has radically diminished the areas where 
they are free from external influence.3 Second, they posit that states 
no longer dominate the international landscape, as international or-
ganizations and private actors (e.g., multinational corporations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and even individuals) exercise 
increasing influence in the creation, implementation, and enforce-
ment of international norms.4 
Discussing the expanding role of private actors in public interna-
tional law, therefore, necessarily involves a discussion of sovereignty. 
2 !d. at 12 ("The inability to regulate the flow of goods, persons, pollutants, diseases, 
and ideas across territorial boundaries has been described as a loss of sovereignty."); Leo 
Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw AND ORGANI-
ZATION 3 (A. Rubin ed., 1993) (articulating the notion of a Westphalian legal order based 
on "states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated to 
no earthly authority"); Philip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions and the Ero-
sion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1944, 1946 (1997) ("[T]he new 
conditions loosely associated under the platitudinous rubric of 'globalism' pose new and 
quite visible challenges to national sovereignty .... "); see also Kanishka Jayasuriya, Global-
ization, Law and the Transfurmation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Govern-
ance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 425 (1999) (arguing that sovereignty is being 
transformed since the concept of it as "exclusive territorial jurisdiction-given the short-
hand term 'Westphalian' ... is no longer theoretically or empirically serviceable in the 
face of the internationalization of economic and social activity"). 
3 Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law: Sover-
eignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 52 STAN. L. REv. 959, 959 (2000) (noting conventional wisdom 
that sovereignty in the sense of a nation's exclusive and absolute power within its territory 
"appears to have diminished significantly in the past half century as a result of economic 
globalization, transportation and communications advances, the rise of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and the spread of international human rights law"); Kal Raustiala, 
Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI.J. INT'L L. 401, 418-19 (2000) ("[W]e are increasingly 
choosing to regulate at the international level. ... Sovereignty traditionally conceived will 
necessarily be compromised .... "); Trimble, supra note 2, at 1948 ("The creation of activ-
ist international institutions necessarily entails more loss of national sovereignty .... "). 
4 Steve Charnovitz, opening the WTO to NonGovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. 
J. 173, 210-11 (2000) [hereinafter Charnovitz I] (noting developing country fears that 
NGO participation in the WTO may diminish their sovereignty, and discussing how sover-
eignty can be challenged by NGOs); Trimble, supra note 2, at 1946 ("In the past, interna-
tional law concerned itself mostly with states and official intergovernmental relations. Now 
it increasingly concerns itself with private personae, including multinational corporations, 
as well as governments, and it deals with subjects that traditionally were treated as purely 
domestic matters."); see also Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at 
First Sight, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 489, 491 (2001) (noting the proliferation of NGOs in the last 
decade). 
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The controversy surrounding the amicus curiae is no exception.5 In 
various contexts, international dispute settlement bodies are now 
wrestling with what role, if any, to give to private actors such as NGOs 
that petition to have their views on a particular case heard. To some, 
allowing the voices of these private interests to be heard in disputes in 
which they would otherwise have no standing constitutes another 
wave of evidence that the sovereignty of states is being eroded; that 
state actors are being weakened by the presence and participation of 
non-state actors in public international law. 6 
By examining the case of the amicus curiae more closely, how-
ever, it becomes clear that it need not serve as further evidence of the 
erosion of sovereignty; to the contrary, one can view these develop-
ments as confirming sovereignty's continuing vitality. Indeed, taking a 
broader view, it is not accurate to say that either the current frenzy of 
private actor participation in international fora or the law-making 
functions of international organizations at which such activity is di-
rected supplants or erodes state sovereignty in some zero-sum game 
paradigm. As the case of the amicus illustrates, both private actor par-
ticipation and the law-making authorities of international organiza-
tions have occurred, and can only continue to occur, with the consent 
of states. States remain at the epicenter of international law-their 
activities continue to dictate not only what the law is today, but also 
who determines what the law is tomorrow. 
To understand this perspective, this Article first briefly examines 
the context in which international tribunals are permitting amicus 
curiae filings, including not only the amicus cases themselves, but also 
the broader context of private actor participation in public interna-
tional law generally. This Article then explores some of the various 
meanings that can be attributed to the concept of sovereignty, and, 
relying on an international conception of the term, demonstrates 
how, looking at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Asbestos con-
troversy as a case-study, states do not need to view the role of private 
5 See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text. 
6 John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 217 
(2000) (decrying the loss of sovereignty that can occur through the mobilization of "civil 
society" in international decision-making); see Charnovitz I, supra note 4, at 199-200, 210-
ll (describing statists' views that nongovernmental interests have no place in intergovern-
mental organization and that giving non-state actors a role in international decision mak-
ing is undemocratic and a challenge to state sovereignty). 
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actors in public international law as a necessary devolution of their 
sovereignty. 7 
I. AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS 
How does the concept of amicus curiae arise in international law? 
Basically, it becomes an issue whenever an international tribunal de-
cides to permit one or more private actors to present to the tribunal 
their views on a case.8 These views are expressed in written briefs and 
labeled amicus curiae, literally, "friend of the court," following the 
Anglo-American tradition.9 Private actors, such as NGOs, industry 
representatives, or even individuals, seek to submit such briefs be-
cause they generally have no right to initiate an international case or 
intervene as a party, and the case's outcome may affect non-parties.I0 
Amicus briefs have been filed and accepted in disputes between states, 
e.g., within the WfO Dispute Settlement system, and have been con-
sidered acceptable in disputes between a state and a private actor, e.g., 
in NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Arbitrations, as well.11 
Where does an international tribunal derive its power to permit 
amicus participation? One could posit, based on the practice of mu-
nicipal legal systems, that such authority is afforded to all tribunals as 
a general principle of international law, much like the principle that 
7 See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text. 
8 See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
judicial Proceedings, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 611, 616 (1994). Amicus briefs suggest to the tribunal 
matters of fact and law within the amici's knowledge, and international tribunals may take 
them into consideration notwithstanding the fact the amici are not able to participate in 
the proceedings and are not bound by its outcome. Id. at 611. 
9 See id. at 611; Padideh Ala'I,judicial Lobbying at the WTO: The Debate over the Amicus Cu-
riae Brieft and the U.S. Experience, 24 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 62, 84-94 (2000) (discussing the 
U.S. experience with amicus curiae). 
10 Shelton, sufrra note 8, at 612. At the same time, courts may accept amicus briefs be-
cause they can contain detailed factual or legal analysis not found in the parties' argu-
ments. Id. at 618. 
11 See, e.g., GATT Appellate Body Report on U.S.-Imp. Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Prods., WT/DS58/AB/R 'fl08 (Oct. 12, 1998), available at 1998 WL 720123 
[hereinafter Shrimp Turtle Appellate Report] (finding that WTO panels have authority under 
the WTO Agreement to accept amicus participation at their discretion); Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amicus Curiae, United Parcel 
Serv. of Am. Inc. v. Canada, 'I 73 (NAFTA Chap. 11 Trib., Oct. 17, 2001) [hereinafter lll'S]. 
In the case of NAFTA, it should be noted that although two NAFTA tribunals have found 
authority to accept amicus briefs, to date, no actual amicus briefs have been filed and ac-
cepted by a NAFTA tribunal. 
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tribunals have the authority to establish their own jurisdiction.12 In-
deed, amicus curiae date back to Roman law and remain a highly visi-
ble component of common law systems, most notably, in the United 
States.13 Even in some civil law systems where amicus participation is 
not explicitly recognized, one finds the functional equivalent of such 
a role through the broad rights of intervention made available to in-
terested persons by courts.14 
International tribunals have not, however, based their authority 
to permit amicus participation on a general principle of international 
law. Instead, they generally make a consensual justification-relying 
on their constituent treaty as evidence that the states creating that in-
strument gave them sufficient powers, either explicitly or tacitly, to 
permit private parties to be heard where it was deemed appropriate. 
For example, at the WTO, the Appellate Body has found that 
both dispute panels and the Appellate Body itself have tacit authority 
under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to admit 
amicus participation.15 In the Shrimp Turtle case, the Appellate Body 
overruled a panel's rejection of amicus briefs by reasoning that DSU 
Article 13 gives panels the discretion to accept amicus participation.16 
12 See Statute of the International Court ofJustice,June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) (c), 59 Stat. 
1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute); see also PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST's MoD-
ERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (7th ed. 1997) (noting how the principle 
that a tribunal is competent to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction in cases of doubt 
was borrowed from national law principles). 
13 Ala'I, supra note 9, at 84; Shelton, supra note 8, at 616. 
14 See Shelton, supra note 8, at 616 ("[T)he position in France and other civil law coun-
tries is to grant broad rights of intervention. Associations and organizations concerned 
with the environment or human rights participate in cases as intervenors, serving the same 
purpose as amici in common law countries."). 
15 Shrimp Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 11, 'I 11 0; GATT Appellate Body Report on 
U.S.-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Bismuth Car-
bon Steel Prods. Originating in the U.K., WT/DS138/ AB/R 'I 39 (May 10, 2000), available 
at 2000 WL 569563 [hereinafter British Steel Appellate Report]. There is no provision in the 
DSU for the submission of amicus curiae briefs. Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
RouND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU). The Appellate Body's finding of 
tacit authority to permit amicus participation has already been subject to extensive schol-
arship. Ala'l, supra note 9, at 67-84; Charnovitz I, supra note 4, at 183-90; Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider, Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 
95-101 (2001). The current analysis, therefore, is limited to discussing how the WTO's 
dispute settlement system has handled the question of its authority to address amicus par-
ticipation. For a discussion of WTO member states' reactions to the dispute settlement 
system's handling of the issue, see infra notes 7&-82 and accompanying text. 
16 Shrimp Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 11, 'I 110. The Shrimp Turtle Panel had re-
jected briefs submitted by two environmental NGOs on the grounds that it lacked the 
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Neither Article 13 nor any other article of the DSU includes an ex-
plicit provision for the submission of amicus briefs. Nevertheless, Arti-
cle 13 does provide that, "[e]ach panel shall have the right to seek 
information and technical advice from any individual or body which it 
deems appropriate .... Panels may seek information from any rele-
vant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion in certain 
aspects of the matter."17 According to the Appellate Body, Article 13 
gave the Shrimp Turtle panel the authority to review or ignore any in-
formation, including NGO submissions, regardless of whether the 
panel had explicitly sought the information in the first place.18 A 
number of governments criticized the Appellate Body's decision on 
the grounds that it was not supported by the DSU, an outcry that 
crested with the Asbestos case discussed below.l9 
In the British Steel Appellate Report, the Appellate Body found 
that it also had discretionary authority to accept and consider amicus 
submissions during the appellate review process.2° Although it con-
cluded that it would not take the particular briefs it had received into 
account, the Appellate Body reasoned that Article 17.9 of the DSU 
gave it broad discretionary authority that allowed it to accept such 
briefs.21 DSU Article 17.9 provides the Appellate Body with authority 
to adopt procedural rules that do not conflict with rules and proce-
authority to accept them under the DSU. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S.-Imp. 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prods., Wf/DS58/R t 7.8 (May 15, 1998), 
availabk at 1998 WL 256632 [hereinafter Shrimp Turtk Panel Report]. In two prior cases, 
panels had not even acknowledged NGO amicus submissions. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Ap-
pellate Body Under Fire for Move to Accept Amicus Curiae Briefs from NGOs, 47 INT'L TRADE REP. 
(BNA) 1805 (Nov. 30, 2000) (discussing cases concerning EU Measures concerning Meat and 
Meat Products and States' Standards for Reformulated Gasoline). The Shrimp Turtk Panel did 
indicate that it would accept amicus briefs where a state appended them to its own submis-
sions. Shrimp Turtk Panel Report f. 7.8. 
17 DSU, supra note 15, art. 13. 
18 See Shrimp Turtk Appellate Report, supra note 11, 'll 108 ( " [A] Panel has the discretion-
ary authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted 
to it, whether requested by a panel or not."). In several later cases, panels have followed 
the Appellate Body's interpretation of the DSU and allowed both solicited and unsolicited 
amicus briefs, although these panels have not necessarily taken the briefs into account in 
their decisions. See Ala'I, supra note 9, at 72-77 (discussing a panel's solicitation of expert 
amicus opinions in the Australia-Salmon case and more controversial acceptances of unso-
licited amicus briefs in cases involving U.S. Copyright, EC-Bed Linen, and EU Measures Affect-
ing Asbestos). 
19 Charnovitz I, supra note 4, at 185; Pruzin, supra note 16, at 1805; see also infra notes 
76--82 and accompanying text. 
20 British Steel Appellate Report, supra note 15, 'I 39. 
21 Id. n 39-42. 
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dures of the DSU or the covered WfO agreements.22 The Appellate 
Body also relied on the fact that, pursuant to Article 17.9, it had estab-
lished Working Procedures, including Rule 16(1), which authorized 
the creation of appropriate procedures when a question arises that is 
not covered by the Working Procedures. 23 Thus, the Appellate Body, 
as it did in the Shrimp Turtle Appellate Report with respect to panel 
action, made a textual analysis of its constitutive document, the DSU, 
to find implied authority to permit amicus participation. 
Such a textual analysis of the amicus question by tribunals is not 
limited to the WfO. NAFfA Chapter 11 investor-state arbitral tribu-
nals have engaged in similar reasoning. In an October 17, 2001, arbi-
tral decision, United Parcel Services of America, Inc. v. Canada, a NAFfA 
Tribunal confirmed its power to permit amicus briefs on the grounds 
that NAFfA's dispute settlement provisions, NAFfA Article 1120, 
authorized the Tribunal to proceed on the basis of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.24 The Tribunal found that Article 15(1) of UNCI-
TRAL's rules, in turn, tacitly gave it authority to accept amicus briefs 
since it authorized the Tribunal to "conduct the arbitration in such 
manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are 
treated with equality and that at any stage in the proceedings each 
party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case. "25 The Tribu-
nal concluded that its authority to accept amicus briefs was appropri-
ate so long as such participation did not affect the rights of the disput-
ing parties. 26 
The UPS decision reached the same conclusions as an earlier 
NAFfA Chapter 11 decision, Methanex Corp. v. United States, which also 
invoked UNCITRAL Article 15(1) as the implied basis for amici par-
ticipation. 27 In both cases, the tribunals supported their reliance on 
22 DSU, supra note 15, art. 17.9. 
2~ See British Steel Appellate Report, supra note 15, 1 38; Appellate Body, Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review, WI I AB/WP /3 (Feb. 28, 1997). 
24 UPS, supra note 11, t 61; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 296, 296 (1993), available at http:/ /www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2002). 
25 See UPS, supra note 11, tt 20, 60; U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE, UNCITRAL ARBI-
TRAL RuLEs, available at http:/ /www.uncitral.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2002). 
26 UPS, supra note 11, 1 61. In so ruling, the Tribunal noted that amicus participation 
was consistent with NAFTA itself as nothing in allowing amicus briefs contravened the 
right of NAFTA parties to intervene in a case, or the ability of the Tribunal to seek inde-
pendent expert advice on specialized factual matters, both of which were authorities ex-
plicitly provided by NAFTAArticles 1128 and 1133. /d. t 62. 
27 Methanex Corp. v. United States, 16 MEALEY's INT'L ARB. REP. D-1, t 5 (NAFTA Ch. 
11 Trib.,Jan. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Methanex]. The Tribunal saw its ability to accept ami-
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Article 15(1) by noting that the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal had ren-
dered the same result in Case A/15.28 They contrasted such findings 
with the practice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of not ac-
cepting participation by anyone other than states, and in certain 
cases, public international organizations, because the ICJ Statute itself 
so limited the court's authority.29 Finally, both tribunals declined to 
consider as decisive the existence of amicus rules in the domestic laws 
of two of the NAFTA parties in favor of a tacit textual analysis of UN-
CITRAL Article 15 ( 1). 30 
The approach by international tribunals to private participation 
in these cases-i.e., looking to their own authorities to find an ex-
plicit, or in most cases, a tacit grant of authority to allow amici par-
ticipation-is not limited to the trade context. As Professor Shelton 
detailed in 1994, other tribunals, notably the European Court of Jus-
tice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights are all examples where, with explicit or tacit 
authorization, international tribunals have permitted private actors to 
serve an amicus function. 31 To this list, one might soon add the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC); Rule 103 of the draft ICC Rules of 
Procedure provides that the ICC may, if it deems it desirable, "[a]t any 
stage of the proceedings ... invite or grant leave to a State, organiza-
tion or person to submit, in writing or orally, any observation on any 
issue that the Chamber deems appropriate. "32 
cus briefs as the exercise of a procedural power, not equivalent to accepting an intervenor 
as a full party to a case. See id. tt 29-31. For example, NAFTA amici have no rights tore-
ceive any of the materials generated by the arbitration; their access to the case's proceed-
ings is like any other member of the public. ld. i 46. 
28 Id. t 32; UPS, supra note 11, t 64 (citing Iran v. United States, Case A/15, 2 Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Rep. 40, 43, where foreign banks were able to submit their own memoranda to 
the Tribunal). Moreover, the NAFTA Tribunals noted that Article 15(1) was worded more 
broadly than the language on which the British Steel Appellate Repart had relied in finding a 
discretionary authority to accept WfO amici participation. See Methanex, supra note 27, 
, 33. 
29 Methanex, supra note 27, t 34 (citing ICJ Statute, supra note 12, arts. 34, 35, 61-64); 
UPS, supra note 11, i 64. But see Shelton, supra note 8, at 623-24 (noting that the ICJ did 
accept one amicus brief from an NGO in the 1950 South-West Mrica advisory proceeding, 
but rejected the same NGO's request to submit a brief in the contentious 1950 Asylum 
case). 
80 Methanex, supra note 27, t 47; UPS, supra note 11, t 65. 
51 Shelton, supra note 8, at 629, 631-32, 638. 
52 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized Draft Text of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, June 30, 2000, Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/ Add.1 (Nov. 20, 
2000), availabk at http:/ /www.un.org/law/icc/prepcom/prepfra.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 
2002). 
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Thus, the so-called case of the amicus, which, as discussed below, 
has recently been so controversial at the WTO, is, with the notable 
exception of the ICJ, a relatively widespread phenomenon in modern 
international dispute settlements. It is, however, a phenomenon that 
has emerged with the consent of states, not in spite of them. Even 
where the participation is limited to an amicus role, international tri-
bunals have looked to their constitutive instruments to determine 
whether the states that created those instruments either expressly or 
tacitly authorized them to involve private actors in the proceedings. 
II. PRIVATE AcToRs AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
The limited participation by private actors as amici in interna-
tional dispute settlement is consistent with the practice of private ac-
tor participation in international law generally, most notably NGOs. 
Although states and, to a lesser extent, public international organiza-
tions create, implement, and enforce international law, private actors 
play some role in that process.33 Looking at the activities of individu-
als, and more specifically NGOs, one finds evidence of an influence 
both in the formation and the application of international law, albeit 
one that is qualitatively and quantitatively less than that of states and 
international organizations. 34 
Private actors engage in the formation of international law in 
various ways. They can, at the request of a government, serve on na-
tional delegations to conferences that negotiate and adopt treaties. 
For example, the U.S. delegation to the conference that negotiated 
33 Whether individuals, and thus NGOs, are formally considered subjects of interna-
tional law is a debate this Article does not address. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PuB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 605 (5th ed. 1998) ("[C]ontroversy as to whether the individual is 
a subject of law is not always very fruitful in practical terms, and the issue is always viewed 
with the idea of proving that he is a subject vel non. He probably is in particular contexts 
.... "); L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw 639 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) 
("[F]act that individuals are normally the object of International Law does not mean that 
they are not, in certain cases, the direct subjects thereof"); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The 
Position of the Individual in International Law, 31 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 241, 252 (2001) ("[T]he 
distinction between the nature oflegal capacity of State and international organizations on 
the one hand, and individuals on the other, is apparent. The individual does not have any 
legal capacity under general international law."). Without prejudice to that debate, the 
current study examines the role individuals and NGOs have in the formation and applica-
tion of international law, not with a view to establishing their own place in the interna-
tional legal order, but rather examining the impact such activities have on the principal 
actor in that order-the sovereign state. 
34 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Gov-
ernance, 18 MICH.]. INT'L L. 183, 280-81 (1997) [hereinafter Charnovitz II). 
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the 2000 Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean included representatives not only from the U.S. Department of 
State and other federal agencies, but representatives from environ-
mental NGOs and the U.S. fishing industry as well.35 Although such 
participation is controlled by the national government, in the case of 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) national delegations in-
clude private representatives who are able to act independently of 
their governments. 36 
Where states have agreed to open negotiations, NGOs and other 
private actors have also come to play a significant independent role as 
observers in conferences to negotiate various multilateral treaties. Al-
though they generally do not have a role in the formal negotiations or 
the treaty's final adoption, as observers, NGOs and other private ac-
tors may speak before the conference, make proposals, and substan-
tially influence the negotiation's outcome.37 For example, NGOs 
played a significant role in drafting the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.38 More recently, 236 NGOs participated in the 
conference that negotiated the Rome Treaty, playing a widely ac-
knowledged role in bringing the states to agreement. 39 Similar NGO 
involvement has also been recorded in climate change negotiations.40 
Thus, although it may not always be formal, and is certainly not uni-
35 NGOs represented on the U.S. delegation included the World Wildlife Fund and 
the Audubon Society, while the U.S. fishing industry was represented by the U.S. Tuna 
Foundation, the American Fishermen's Research Foundation, and the Western Fishboat 
Owner's Association. 
36 The Constitution of the ILO provides that each member state has four delegates to 
the organization-two from the state's government, one representing the employers in the 
state, and one representing workers in the state--each of whom votes individually. See 
INT'L LABOUR 0RG. CONST., as amended, arts. 3.1, 4.1, available at http:/ /www.ilo.org/ 
public/english/about/iloconst.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2002). 
37 See, e.g., Charnovitz II, supra note 34, at 281. Although the general rule is that NGOs 
have no negotiating role, in some rare cases NGOs have participated and signed the final 
act at an official conference to draft a treaty, as was the case with the International Cham-
ber of Commerce at the League of Nation's Conference on Customs Formalities. /d. 
38 /d. at 264. 
39 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 22, 23 (1999); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, 32 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 443, 455 (1999) (counting 238 
NGOs at the Rome conference). 
40 See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 345, 350 (2000) (recalling that at the negotiations for the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol NGOs distributed information, prepared agreed 
positions on issues, and developed a draft text of the Convention as an advocate to gov-
ernments). 
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versal, the role of NGOs and other private actors in influencing the 
norms adopted in various multilateral negotiations is undeniable. 
Limited private actor participation in the formation of interna-
tional law is replicated in its application. Just as they act as observers 
at treaty negotiations, NGOs may be permitted to occupy a more 
permanent role as observers to various public international organiza-
tions.41 Thus, the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) cur-
rently maintains a registry of 2091 NGOs that are eligible to engage in 
certain limited and defined actions before the ECOSOC.42 NGOs can 
also act as advocates, making presentations to states favoring the 
adoption of a particular interpretation of international law. Although 
recognized as a sui generis NGO given its status under the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a long history of play-
ing a role in monitoring how states apply international humanitarian 
41 See HENRY G. ScHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 126-28 (3d ed. 1995). The Council of Europe currently recognizes 423 NGOs as hav-
ing consultative status, who not only meet independently but also select twenty-five NGOs 
to act as liaisons with the Council itself. See id. at 133; Liaison Committee of the Non-
Governmental Organizations Enjoying Consultative Status with the Council of Europe, 
RepOTt of 2001 PIRnaTy ConfeTence of NGOs (Jan. 23, 2001), availnble at http:/ /www.ngo.coe. 
int/English%20Site/Plenary_Conference/reports.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2002). In the 
case of the World Tourist Organization, there is a category of affiliate membership, open 
to NGOs, commercial bodies, and associations, from which three are selected as observers 
to the Organization's Congress and one selected as an observer to its Board. See 
ScHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra, at 118-19; World Tourism Organization, About WTO, at 
http:/ /www.world-tourism.org/ / aboutwto/aboutwto.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002). Such 
participation is not limited to NGOs; several private companies serve as members of the 
Consultative Committees of the International Telecommunications Union, enjoying all the 
privileges of membership except the right to vote in plenary meetings when their state is 
also represented. ScHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra, at 133-34. 
42 For a list of the registry, see U.N. Economic & Social Council Non-Governmental 
Organizations Section, Economic and Social Council Non-GoveTnmental OTganizations, at 
http:/ /www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo (last visited Mar. 8, 2002) (listing 2091 NGOs 
in consultative status with ECOSOC). Article 71 of the U.N. Charter provides that 
ECOSOC may "make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental or-
ganizations which are concerned with matters within its competence." U.N. Charter art. 
71. These NGOs are subdivided into three categories-those concerned with most of the 
activities of the ECOSOC (Category I), those concerned with only a few fields of activities 
covered by ECOSOC (Category II), and those not closely related to the work of ECOSOC 
but of sufficient importance to be related in some way to the U.N. (Organizations on the 
Roster). SeeSCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supm note 41, at 130. ECOSOC consults with all these 
organizations through a Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations made up of 
nineteen government representatives. Although the results have been very limited in prac-
tice, Category I & II organizations are permitted to submit limited written statements, and 
in a few circumstances, speak in the ECOSOC, while Organizations on the Roster may only 
submit written statements at the request of the Secretary General. See id. at 131. 
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law.43 NGOs also publish reports analyzing how states are meeting 
their international legal obligations, most often in the human rights 
context.44 
In certain situations, private actors may petition states or interna-
tional organizations directly about whether particular acts conform to 
international law. For example, in a side agreement to NAFfA-the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation-Can-
ada, Mexico, and the United States authorized private parties to sub-
mit allegations that any one of the three states had failed to enforce 
its environmental laws effectively.45 At the World Bank, NGOs or 
groups of individuals may request an Inspection Panel to investigate 
claims of injury arising out of an act or omission of the Bank resulting 
from its failure to follow operational policies and procedures with re-
spect to the design, appraisal, and/ or implementation of a Bank proj-
ect.46 
Private parties may even participate directly with states in review-
ing the implementation of an international agreement. The 1998 
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program pro-
vides for an International Review Panel (IRP), made up not only of 
representatives of the parties, but also three representatives from ex-
43 ScHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 41, at 33; Charnovitz II, supra note 34, at 271. 
The ICRC has also played a significant role in the formation of international humanitarian 
Jaw, most recently in its efforts to ensure international legal norms on the explosive rem-
nants of war. For more on these efforts, see Press Release 01/68, IRCR, Explosive Rem-
nants oflnternational War: ICRC Calls for New International Agreement (Dec. 11, 2001), 
available at http:/ /www.icrc.org/ eng/ news (last visited Mar. 8, 2002). 
44 See Charnovitz II, supra note 34, at 271. Calls by NGOs and others for compliance 
with international legal standards, of course, have no legal effect in and of themselves, but 
depending on the context of the reports, may influence how states or international or-
ganizations apply the Jaw. See id. at 269. 
45 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 
arts. 14-15, 32 I.L.M. 1482 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC]; Charnovitz II, supra note 34, at 
272. Private parties submit their petitions to the NAAEC Secretariat where they are "aimed 
at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry." The Secretariat may request 
a government to respond to the allegations, and in cases where two of the three states' 
representatives agree, prepare a factual record and release it to the public. NAAEC arts. 
14(2), 15. 
46 See Chi Carmody, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic 
Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1321, 1329 (2000). Set up in 1993, the Inspection Panel re-
views complaints and makes recommendations to the Bank's Board of Directors on which 
ones to investigate, with an actual investigation by the Panel coming only with the Board's 
approval. SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 41, at 450-51. The Panel's conclusions are 
advisory only and final decisions rest with the Board. /d. Interestingly, the Panel's Operat-
ing Procedures do allow for private actor participation; any member of the public can 
provide the Panel with written views not to exceed ten pages. Carmody, supra, at 1332. 
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perienced environmental NGOs and three representatives from the 
affected tuna industry. 47 IRP responsibilities include, inter alia, analysis 
of reports submitted to the IRP regarding fishing by vessels covered by 
the Agreement, identification of possible infractions of the Agree-
ment, and coordination with the party whose flag the vessel flies of 
possible infractions and any enforcement actions taken with respect 
to that vessel. 48 
Moreover, it is a mistake to assume that these examples of private 
actor participation in the international legal order reflect an entirely 
new phenomenon. As Steve Charnovitz's enlightening article, Two 
Centuries of NCO Participation in International Governance, articulates, 
NGO participation in international affairs is a well-established prac-
tice that has at various periods in the past exercised an influence on 
international law.49 For example, numerous peace societies at the 
Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 engaged in lobbying and 
mass publicity much like modern-day NGO activities at multilateral 
treaty negotiations.50 Thus, although one can consider the current 
level of private actor activity in the international legal order to be at a 
high-water mark, it is not without precedent. As with amici, moreover, 
such participation has occurred because states have consented to 
NGOs and others playing a role in particular fora or processes en-
gaged in the formation and implementation of international law. 
Ill. SOVEREIGNTY RECONSIDERED 
Thus, looking at the scope of existing private actor participation 
in international law from both the perspective of the amicus curiae 
and the more general practice of NGOs, the debate is not whether 
private actors should participate in international law at all, but the 
extent to which they should participate. It is the increased participa-
tion of private actors in the international legal order, together with a 
more vigorous role for international organizations, that has, in turn, 
led to claims that the role of the state in that order is eroding; i.e., 
that private actor participation diminishes the sovereignty of states. 
4' Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, May 15, 1998, An-
nex VII(2), available at http:/ /www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/dolphin.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2002). NGO representatives are selected by an election of the states' parties 
from a slate of candidates submitted by the relevant NGOs. See id. Annex VII ( 4). 
48 !d. Annex VII ( 1) . 
49 Charnovtiz II, supra note 34, at 185. 
50 Id. at 196--97. 
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Such claims do not, however, withstand scrutiny if one examines the 
concept of sovereignty more closely. 
The term sovereignty has always been susceptible to various 
meanings. 51 As originally expressed in the works of Machiavelli, 
Bodin, and Hobbes, it served as an attempt to localize a single su-
preme legislative and political authority within the internal structure 
of a polity. 52 As a corollary to this theory, the term sovereignty came to 
describe not only the relationship between a supreme authority and 
its subjects within a state, but also the relationship of that authority 
with other states.53 Simply put, sovereignty could be considered a 
form of absolute domestic jurisdiction-the exclusion of external ac-
tors from domestic authority structures within a given territory.54 
It is this domestic jurisdiction concept of sovereignty that many 
argue is subject to erosion at the hands of globalization, the increas-
ing power of international organizations, and the expanding role of 
private actors in internationallaw.55 That perspective has an obvious 
appeal. There is no doubt that international law recognizes fewer top-
ics today as within the reserved domain of states' respective domestic 
jurisdictions.56 Topics such as monetary policy, human rights, and en-
vironmental protection, which were all previously considered within 
the sole purview of individual state actors to address as they sought fit 
within their borders, are now all recognized as appropriate subjects 
for international regulation by agreement among states. 57 
51 See Raustiala, supra note 3, at 401. 
52 MALANCZUK, supra note 12, at 17; KRAsNER, supra note 1, at 11. It is worth noting 
that theorists such as Locke, Mill, and Marx have all challenged this approach as not nec-
essarily reflecting the divisions of authority that exist within most states. KRASNER, supra 
note 1, at 11. 
53 MALANCZUK, supra note 12, at 17. 
54 See KRAsNER, supra note 1, at 3-4; see also Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 967 (noting 
that the traditional conception of sovereignty reflected the right of a state to determine its 
own Constitution, its own commercial policies, and to treat its subjects according to its 
discretion). Krasner notes that this concept of sovereignty is often called Westphalian sov-
ereignty, although the principle that it reflects "had virtually nothing to do with the Peace 
of Westphalia." KRAsNER, supra note 1, at 20. Accordingly, that term is not used herein. 
55 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
56 Jayasuriya, supra note 2, at 428 ("[E]xtensive international effort to regulate envi-
ronmental, health, weapons and even human rights standards bears witness to this trend 
toward international regulation .... "); Trimble, supra note 2, at 1946 (providing that in-
ternational law now "deals with subjects that traditionally were treated as purely domestic 
matters"). 
57 SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 41, at 4 ("The present substance of international 
law includes a number of issues that previously belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
states. Trade and monetary policy, social policy, human rights, environment protection are 
some striking examples."). 
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Ultimately, however, as Stephen Kramer argues in Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy, it is a fallacy to say that there ever was such a sys-
tem of sovereign states, each having absolute domestic jurisdiction 
over its territory to the exclusion of all other states. 58 To the contrary, 
states have always been subject to external normative influences. The 
Peace of Westphalia, most often cited as the source of the notion of 
sovereign states operating within their domestic jurisdictions free 
from the influence of outside actors, itself included derogations from 
this principle.59 The Treaty of Osnabriick contained conditions by 
which the parties agreed to allow religious minorities under their re-
spective jurisdictions freedom of religion.60 The reality of state inter-
action further belies the notion that states have ever been free from 
external interference. The Gunboat Diplomacy of the 19th century 
serves as a stark example of how the domestic jurisdiction theory of 
sovereignty reflected a theoretical construct more than a practical re-
ality.6I 
Such difficulties in lining up the absolute domestic jurisdiction 
theory of sovereignty with actual state practice make it worthwhile to 
examine alternative conceptions of sovereignty. Among these, one 
stands out-international sovereignty-as more accurately reflecting 
the reality of state behavior on the international plane.62 International 
sovereignty conceives of sovereignty not in terms of domestic jurisdic-
tion, but in terms of status in the international community.63 It is most 
often characterized in terms of membership in a community of 
equally sovereign states, but it perhaps can be better understood 
58 KRASNER, supra note 1, at 24-25; see also SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 41, at 2 
(noting the tension between formal independence, or sovereignty, of states and their ac-
tual interdependence). 
59 See KRASNER, supra note 1, at 73, 75. 
60 Gross, supra note 2, at 5. Similar protections for both religious and ethnic rights can 
be found in treaties throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. ld. at 5-7; Goldsmith, 
supra note 3, at 968. 
61 See KRAsNER, supra note 1, at 128. 
62 See id. at 14-20 (distinguishing international legal sovereignty from three other types 
of sovereignty-Westphalian, domestic, and interdependent); CHAvEs & CHAVES, THE 
NEw SoVEREIGNTY 27 (1995) ("Sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to 
act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in reasonably good 
standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life."). Krasner also 
critiques international sovereignty, finding that it too has been subject to breach, i.e., states 
recognizing non-state actors as states or refusing to recognize entities that otherwise qual-
if}' as states, but later notes that the tension between the rule and actual practice is less 
severe than the case of the absolute domestic jurisdiction theory of sovereignty. See KRAs-
NER, supra note 1, at 25. 
ss CHAVES & CHAVES, supra note 62, at 27; Raustiala, supra note 3, at 417-18. 
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through association with the concept of international legal personal-
ity-the capacity to exercise rights and duties in the international le-
gal order.64 Specifically, states having international sovereignty have 
the general capacity to operate internationally. They can, inter alia, 
make international claims, participate in international adjudications, 
and engage in both the formation and application of international 
law through treaties and/or custom.65 
It is this concept of international sovereignty-the notion of 
states having international legal personality-that is reinforced rather 
than eroded by recent examples of private actor participation and in-
ternational institutional law-making. As Schermers and Blokker em-
phasize in their classic treatise, International Institutional Law, "[t]he 
fact that during the twentieth century public international law has 
imposed substantial limitations upon the freedom of states does not 
take away their legal status as sovereign entities as long as the essence 
of state functions are retained. "66 
Indeed, if private actor participation or international institu-
tional law-making were eroding a state's international sovereignty, 
then presumably their views and their consent would matter less. One 
would no longer be able to say that the general consent of states cre-
ates rules of general application. One would no longer need to see if 
states accept the legitimacy of international organization activities or 
the participation of private actors in the formation or application of 
international law. 
The truth, however, is that no such state of affairs exists. The 
general consent of states creating rules of general application remains 
the operating principle of the international legal order.67 By treaty or 
by practice, it is states whose conduct determines the rules of interna-
tional law. What has changed is that states have opened the door to 
allow others some limited level of international sovereignty. Modern 
states recognize the ability of other actors to have rights and duties on 
the international plane, a status that, while certainly not equal to 
states, is sufficient for those actors to participate in the formation, 
implementation, and even the enforcement of international law. Pub-
lic international organizations have had such a status for some time 
64 BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 57-58 (defining a legal person as "an entity of a type 
recognized by customary international law as capable of possessing rights and duties and of 
bringing international claims, and having these capacities conferred upon it"). 
65 See id. at 57. 
66 SCHERMERS & BWKKER, supra note 41, at 5. 
67 See BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 2. 
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now.68 Private actors are now seeking to gain, or in some cases reestab-
lish,69 recognition of their own limited international sovereignty. 
IV. ExERCISING SovEREIGNTY IN THE WTO AsBEsTos CoNTROVERSY 
It would be a mistake to see this situation as a zero-sum game-
the notion that new subjects of international law mean that the old sub-
jects, states, lose their status or have it eroded in some way. They have 
not. Indeed, the controversy over amicus participation in the Asbestos 
case serves as a prime example of the continuing vitality of the inter-
national sovereignty of states in the very context, i.e., the WTO, that 
so many allege is leading to sovereignty's erosion.70 
In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body, relying on the fact that 
the underlying panel had received five amicus submissions (of which 
two were taken into account), adopted rules for how it would process 
amicus submissions, which were subsequently posted on the WTO 
website.71 This represented a departure from its prior practice of ac-
cepting amicus briefs only when they either were attached to the par-
ties' briefs or were unsolicited.72 The Appellate Body justified the 
move on the same bases it had previously cited for amicus participa-
tion-Article 17.9 of the DSU and Rule 16(1) of its Working Proce-
dures.73 In the procedures themselves, the Appellate Body required 
NGOs wishing to submit an amicus brief to apply for leave in advance 
by showing, inter alia, how "the applicant will make a contribution to 
the resolution of this dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of what 
has already been submitted by a party or third party to this dispute. "74 
The Appellate Body received eleven timely applications (and six un-
timely ones) from environmental NGOs, victims rights groups, the 
68 Id. at 57-58, 678-81. 
69 Charnovitz II, supra note 34, at 286 ("Before the League of Nations, there were few 
international organizations built by diplomats without advance work by NGOs and vision-
ary individuals. The League provided for NGO involvement in its early years, but then 
NGOs were squeezed out in favor of routinized governmental interaction .... The decade 
of the 1990s has provided new opportunities for NGO participation."). 
7o See GATT Appellate Body Report on Eur. Cmty.-Measures Mfecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Prods., Wf/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 2001 WL 
256081 [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate &port]. 
71 Id. '1'1 50-51. 
72 See Pruzin, supra note 16, at 1805. 
73 Asbestos Appellate &port, supra note 70, ,, 50-51; see supra note 23 and accompanying 
text. 
74 Asbestos Appellate &port, supra note 70, t 52(3) (f). 
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chemical trade industry, professional health societies, and academ-
ics.75 
At Egypt's request, the WfO General Council held a special ses-
sion on November 22, 2000 to discuss the Appellate Body's proce-
dures.76 With the exception of the United States, which took the view 
that the Appellate Body had the authority under the DSU to allow 
amicus participation and, therefore, the authority to adopt proce-
dures governing such participation, wro member delegations were 
highly critical of the Appellate Body's actions." Two arguments in 
particular dominated the session. First, the majority of delegations 
took the view that the Appellate Body's adoption of rules of proce-
dure for amicus participation went beyond its authorities under the 
DSU.78 Second, a large number of delegations made the point that 
the issue of non-state actor participation in an intergovernmental or-
ganization such as the wro was a matter for the members to settle, 
not the dispute settlement system.'9 As one delegation emphasized, 
7s See id. U 55-57. 
76 For a detailed account of the WfO Minutes, see WfO General Council, Minutes of 
WTO General Council Meeting, Wf/GC/M/60 (Nov. 22, 2000), available at 
http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 
2002) [hereinafter General Council Minutes]. 
77 See id. tt 74-77 (expressing the views of the United States). None of the other 
twenty-eight member delegations that took the floor at the General Council Meeting en-
dorsed the Appellate Body's approach. Although a number of states appeared willing to 
concede that amicus participation before dispute settlement panels was less controversial, 
only three states-the United States, New Zealand, and Japan-indicated support for the 
Appellate Body's earlier ad hoc acceptance of amicus briefs. See id. tt 76, 87, 111; see also 
id. U 13, 25, 63, 79, 98, 102 (expressing the views of Egypt, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Tur-
key, Chile, and Panama noting the differing authorities of panels and the appellate body 
with respect to non-party participation). 
78 See id. n 6, 10-12, 39, 42, 50, 54, 63, 70, 78, 79, 89, 93, 97, 98, 106, 112 (expressing 
the views of Uruguay, Egypt, India, Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Switzerland, Costa Rica, 
Bolivia, Turkey, Jamaica, Argentina, Cuba, Chile, Tanzania, and Japan that the Appellate 
Body's procedural rules for amicus participation in the Asbestos case went beyond its man-
date). It should be noted that a number of states at the session (e.g., Egypt, Columbia, and 
Singapore) spoke as representatives of groups of states (e.g., the Informal Group of Devel-
oping Countries, ANDEAN, ASEAN, etc.). 
79 See General Council Minutes, supra note 76, tt 9, 15, 22, 38, 52, 55, 58, 61, 64, 69, 
73, 81, 83, 87, 96, 105, 107 (views of Uruguay, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, Colum-
bia, Zimbabwe, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Turkey, Hungary, New Zealand, 
European Communities, Australia, and Tanzania that issue of amicus participation was 
responsibility of wro members to resolve). Delegations also complained that allowing 
rules on amicus participation granted procedural rights beyond those available to wro 
members who were not parties or third parties to an Appellate Body proceeding. See id. t 7 
(expressing the views of Uruguay). Others pointed out that the issue of amicus participa-
tion had been raised during the negotiation of the DSU and not adopted. See id. t 50 (ex-
pressing the views of Mexico). 
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the General Council, not the Appellate Body, has authority under Ar-
ticle V (2) of the WTO Agreement to "make arrangements for consul-
tation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations con-
cerned with matters related to those of the WT0."80 As a result of the 
meeting, the Chair concluded that "the Appellate Body should exer-
cise extreme caution in future cases until Members had considered 
what rules were needed. "81 The Appellate Body subsequently rejected 
all of the requests for leave to file amicus briefs "for failure to comply 
sufficiently with all the requirements" set out in the Appellate Body's 
procedures. 82 
As noted above, amicus cases typically involve dispute settlement 
organs of an international organization, which themselves possess lim-
ited international sovereignty, trying to determine whether they have 
authority to open the door to the international plane to other non-
state actors. 83 In most cases, they find the tacit, and in a few cases ex-
plicit, authority to do so in their constitutive instruments. That these 
organs would exercise independent authority to assess their own pow-
ers is not unexpected. After all, the states that established these bodies 
consented to the bodies making legal rulings that would bind the 
states themselves. In doing so, however, states were not removing 
themselves from the equation entirely. State consent is not only an 
initial prerequisite to a dispute settlement body's exercise of its 
authorities, but as the Asbestos controversy demonstrates, an ongoing 
requirement. States must remain confident in the dispute settlement 
system's exercise of the authorities those states granted it for the sys-
tem to have continued legitimacy.84 
From the Appellate Body's perspective, indeed from the perspec-
tive of the United States, opening the door to limited private actor 
participation in WTO dispute settlement through amicus briefs fell 
well within the Appellate Body's power. And, if it had such a power, it 
80 See id. 'I 6 (expressing the views of Uruguay); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY RouND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
81 General Council Minutes, supra note 76, 'l[ 120. 
82 Asbestos Appellate Report, supra note 70, 'I 56. 
83 See supra notes 8-32 and accompanying texts. 
84 General Council Minutes, supra note 76, 'I 65 (providing that Pakistan notes impor-
tance of Members retaining confidence in the dispute settlement system); id. , 107 (set-
ting forth Tanzania's statement that, "The General Council had the authority to interpret 
the WTO Agreements ... the will of Members should prevail [on allowing amicus partici-
pation] and that no other body, even the Appellate Body could claim what Members had 
not intended to give it."). 
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would follow that it would have the power to lay down rules on how it 
should exercise that power. The hostile reaction of wro member 
states to that last step of laying down rules, however, showed that such 
an interpretation of the Body's procedural authorities went too far for 
most wro members. 
Although the WfO General Council recognized that the Appel-
late Body does have certain procedural powers in conducting pro-
ceedings, the prevailing view appears to be that laying down rules for 
NGO participation in the proceedings is not one of them.85 According 
to the WfO General Council, they, not the Appellate Body, would de-
termine the relationship between the WfO and NGOs, and that in 
the meantime, the Appellate Body should exercise extreme caution.86 
One cannot know definitively if this message motivated the Asbestos 
Appellate Body to reject all of the amicus briefs submitted to it, but it 
would not seem to be a far-fetched assumption. Moreover, as its sub-
sequent practice already confirms, the Appellate Body will need to 
interpret its own procedural authorities in the future by taking into 
account the interpretations of such authorities by the members that 
granted them.s7 
This is not to suggest that the Asbestos controversy stands for the 
rejection of private party participation in the international legal or-
der-far from it. Rather, it stands for the principle that states will con-
tinue to determine who may participate in that order. In some cases, 
states have delegated that determination to international organiza-
tions, either tacitly or explicitly, and the amicus practice of many in-
ternational tribunals reflects part of the outcome of that delegation. 
At the same time, the Asbestos controversy demonstrates that there will 
be other situations where states (and other entities possessing interna-
85 See id. 1 73 (expressing Canadian views noting that issues surrounding amicus par-
ticipation "could not be characterized as exclusively procedural"). 
86 See id. 11 119-20 (providing a statement of the General Council Chairman summa-
rizing views expressed during the Special Session). 
87 Most recently in a second Shrimp Turtle Appellate Body case, the Appellate Body re-
ceived two amicus briefs (one of which was sent directly to the Appellate Body and at-
tached to the brief of the United States). In neither case did the Appellate Body take tl1e 
views expressed into consideration. Indeed, in the case of the brief that the United States 
attached to its own pleadings, the Appellate Body, upon learning that the United States 
regarded them as independent views, focused its attention only on the legal arguments in 
the U.S. submission. GATT Appellate Body Report on U.S.-Imp. Prohibition of Certain 
ShrimpandShrimpProds., Wf/DS58/AB/RWU 76--78 (Oct. 22, 2001). 
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tional sovereignty) reserve the right to make that determination on 
their own.88 
CONCLUSION 
When debating globalization, it is important to recognize that, 
although it may be fair to say that it has eroded sovereignty in the 
sense of absolute domestic jurisdiction vis-a-vis an earlier time, the 
international sovereignty of states remains fundamentally unchanged. 
The international legal personality of states is untrammeled. States 
not only continue to have the authority to create, implement, and en-
force international law, they also have the authority to determine who 
else may participate in that process. 
The debate over globalization may make the case that the inter-
national legal order needs to hear new voices, and it appears that ex-
isting actors in that order, not only international organizations but the 
states themselves, are seeking to accommodate the views of private 
actors like NGOs. One way they have done this is through the amicus 
curiae. Through this practice, international tribunals may listen to the 
views from NGOs and other private actors without giving them a for-
mal role as parties in international proceedings. As the Asbestos con-
troversy demonstrates, however, in listening to such new voices, inter-
national organizations and their tribunals should not, and indeed, 
cannot drown out the old voices that created them. 
International law remains both the subject and master of states. It 
may be true that the international legal order will have to address 
questions regarding its legitimacy raised by NGOs and other private 
actors. At the same time, however, in addressing those concerns, in 
admitting or expanding roles for private actors in public international 
law, one cannot lose sight of the need to ensure that the system main-
tains its legitimacy with respect to its existing actors-states. 
88 WfO membership, for example, is not limited to states. A number of non-state ac-
tors are WfO members, e.g., Hong Kong and the European Communities, having the 
same rights and duties under the \VTO Agreement as states, although the EC does not 
have a vote separate from and in addition to its Member states. See WfO Agreement, supra 
note 80, arts. IX, XII, XIV. 
